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Abstract—We address the problem of constructing false data
injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector
(BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to
only power grid measurement data traces collected over a limited
period of time and no other prior knowledge about the grid.
Existing related algorithms are formulated under the assumption
that the attacker has access to measurements collected over a long
(asymptotically infinite) time period, which may not be realistic.
We show that these approaches do not perform well when the
attacker has access to measurements from a limited time window
only. We design an enhanced algorithm to construct FDI attack
vectors in the face of limited measurements that can nevertheless
bypass the BDD with high probability. The algorithm design is
guided by results from random matrix theory. Furthermore, we
characterize an important trade-off between the attack’s BDD-
bypass probability and its sparsity, which affects the spatial
extent of the attack that must be achieved. Extensive simulations
using data traces collected from the MATPOWER simulator and
benchmark IEEE bus systems validate our findings.
Index Terms—Data-driven FDI attack, random matrix theory,
spiked model, sparse false data injection attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing integration of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) in power grids has made them vulnerable
to cyber attacks [2]. In this work, we study the problem of
constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks against state
estimation in a power grid from an attacker’s perspective. It has
been shown [3] that if the attacker obtains detailed knowledge
of the power grid topology and transmission line reactance
values – i.e., the system’s measurement matrix – then they can
construct FDI attacks that bypass the grid’s bad data detector
(BDD). Subsequent research [4], [5], [6], [7] has shown that
an attacker can learn the power grid’s measurement matrix
[4], or learn the structure of its column space by estimating
the basis vectors [5], [6], [7] from accessed measurement data
(i.e., nodal power injections and line power flows) only. The
focus of our work is on constructing these data-driven FDI
attacks. Undetected FDI attacks can severely affect the power
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grid operation, such as unsafe voltage/frequency excursions
[8].
Prior work on designing data-driven BDD-bypass attacks
[5], [6], [7] are based on the technique of principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA), whose basic idea is to use the sample
covariance matrix to identify the eigenmodes along which
the data exhibits the greatest variance. It performs efficiently
when the measurement period is significantly large compared
to the signal dimension [9]. However, data-driven attacks
based on the PCA-based method fail to remain stealthy if
the measurements accessed by the attacker have missing
values (due to communication loss or device malfunctions).
Subsequent work [10] applied a robust-PCA based approach
to deal with this issue. Similar robust learning techniques
were also applied in [11], [12] to deal with the joint problem
of missing measurements and the construction of sparse FDI
attacks. A different stream of work [13], [14] has considered
the problem of crafting FDI attacks when the attacker has
incomplete/partial knowledge of the power grid topology and
transmission line reactances. However, these works do not
consider the attacker’s learning of the grid parameters from
the measurement data. Hence, they do not present a complete
picture of the attacker’s capabilities in this context.
A major drawback of existing work on data-driven FDI
attacks [5], [6], [7], [10], [11], [12] is that they perform
well only when the attacker has access to measurements from
a large time window (asymptotically infinite). For practical
purposes, it is important to understand these attacks under a
limited measurement time window. The reasons include (i)
active topology control [15] or renewable energy integration
that leads to an inherently dynamic operating environment,
thereby rendering measurements outdated and irrelevant after
some time; and (ii) an attacker’s desire or need (e.g., due
to limited resources or limited exploitation time windows)
to launch the attack quickly. Thus, in a practical scenario,
the measurement time period may not be asymptotically large
compared to the signal dimension, especially for large power
grids (refer to the example presented in Section III-B). It has
been demonstrated that under such a regime, the principal
component estimated by PCA is inconsistent [16]. Indeed,
our experiments show that FDI attacks constructed by the
existing PCA-based algorithms [5], [6], [7] do not perform
well (in terms of the BDD-bypass probability) when applied
in a limited measurement period setting.
To address these shortcomings, in this paper, we analyze the
problem of finding a BDD-bypassing attack using measure-
ment data collected from a limited time window (comparable
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2to the measurement signal dimension) and identify guiding
principles for the solution in this context. The analysis pro-
vides an important understanding of the attacker’s capabilities
in designing FDI attacks by accessing the system measure-
ments. The understanding has practical relevance in the design
of defense strategies, such as determining the frequency of
reactance perturbations in the context of moving target defense
[17], which in turn depends on the attacker’s capability of
learning the system parameters.
Under the limited measurement period setting, a key issue
is that only a few eigenmodes can be reliably estimated from
the sample covariance matrix. This number, in turn, depends
on the length of the measurement period relative to the signal
dimension. To bypass the BDD with a high probability, it is
important for the attacker to identify these critical eigenmodes.
Direct application of the PCA method as in [5], [6], [7] does
not use this knowledge, and hence, performs poorly. In this
work, we propose an enhanced algorithm to construct FDI
attacks in the face of limited measurement period that can
nevertheless bypass the BDD with high probability. Our algo-
rithm design is based on results from random matrix theory
(RMT). The application is based on an important observation
that the power grid’s state estimation utilizes several redundant
sensor measurements to filter the effect of measurement noise
and obtain an optimal estimate on the system state [18], [19].
In other words, the dimension of the measurement vector is
much greater than the size of the system state.
Under this setting, the covariance matrix of the sensor
measurements has a structure similar to the so-called “spiked
models” in RMT [20], [21], which comprises of a low-rank
perturbation of a scaled identity matrix. Here, the leading
few eigenmodes correspond to the subspace spanned by the
signal (i.e., system state), whereas the bulk of the eigenmodes
(corresponding to the redundant measurements) correspond
to the noise subspace. For data obtained from the spiked
model, RMT results can be used to characterize the number of
eigenmodes that can be estimated accurately as a function of
the measurement time window, as well as the corresponding
estimation accuracy [20], [21]. Using these results, the attacker
can carefully design the attack vector by restricting it to a
lower-dimensional subspace that is spanned by the accurately
estimated eigenmodes only and bypass the BDD with a high
probability. Otherwise, the inaccurately estimated basis vectors
may mislead the attack vector to a subspace that is different
from the intended one, thereby risking detection by the BDD.
However, restricting the attack vector to a lower-
dimensional subspace of the estimated column space limits the
attacker’s freedom in crafting the FDI attack. In particular, a
resource-constrained attacker may wish to minimize the num-
ber of the meters that must be compromised, or equivalently
find the sparsest attack vector in the execution [22], [23].
Clearly, maximizing the sparsity of the attack vector is best
achieved if we have an unconstrained choice of this vector over
the full estimated column space of the measurement matrix.
Hence, the attacker faces a fundamental tradeoff. On the one
hand, as we observed, restricting the attack vector to a lower-
dimensional subspace (spanned by the accurately estimated
basis vectors) will enhance the BDD-bypass probability under
the limited measurement period setting; i.e., the restriction
makes the attack efficient temporally. On the other hand, this
restriction may reduce the sparsity of the optimized attack
vector, thus making it less efficient spatially. To understand
the tradeoffs between the conflicting objectives, we compute
the sparsest attack vector while constraining it to subspaces of
varying lower dimensions of the full estimated column space.
To summarize, the contributions of this work are as follows.
• We propose an enhanced algorithm to construct data-
driven FDI attacks in the limited measurement period
setting that can bypass the BDD with high probability
using results from RMT.
• We characterize an important trade-off between the FDI
attack’s BDD-bypass probability and the number of
power meters in the grid that the attacker has to com-
promise in achieving the attack.
• We illustrate the fundamental trade-off by performing
extensive simulations using benchmark IEEE bus sys-
tems. The results show that the attacker can significantly
enhance the BDD-bypass probability using our proposed
approach.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to apply
RMT results in the context of smart grid security. While RMT
results have found wide application in other domains such
as wireless communications, finance, physics etc. (we refer
the reader to reference [24], Chapter 1 for a comprehensive
review of RMT applications), its application to smart grids has
been scarce. In particular, the application of the RMT spiked
model results to FDI attack construction is novel and has not
been considered previously, and this is one of the important
contributions of our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the system model in Section II. We review existing subspace
method based algorithms to construct data-driven FDI attacks
and point our their drawbacks in Section III. In Section IV,
we present data-driven FDI attacks under the limited mea-
surements period setting using RMT results and analyze its
performance. The trade-offs in data-driven FDI attacks are
discussed in Section V. The simulation results are presented
in Section VI. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
The technical proofs are presented in Appendices A, B and C.
Notations: Throughout this work, we use boldface lower-
case and uppercase letters to designate column vectors and
matrices, respectively. For a matrix A, we let ai denote its ith
column. The notation As denotes a matrix consisting of the
first s columns of the matrix A, i.e., As = [a1, . . . ,as], for
any integer value s.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a power grid that is characterized by a set
of buses N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} and transmission lines L =
{1, 2, . . . , L}. The node with index 0 is used to represent
the reference node. The grid is assumed to operate in a
time slotted manner indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . , T. To model
power flows within the grid, we adopt the direct current (DC)
power flow model [19]. Under this model, the system state
corresponds to the nodal voltage phase angles, which we
3denote by θ[t] = [θ1[t], . . . , θN [t]]T ; i.e., θi[t], i ∈ N is
the voltage phase angle at bus i during the time slot t. For
the reference bus, θ0[t] = 0,∀t. We assume that the system
state fluctuates around a mean value, e.g., due to the temporal
variations of the load. Thus, θ[t] = θ¯ + [t], where [t]
is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random vector (across time) whose covariance is given
by σ2θI, (where I denotes an identity matrix). Here in, θ¯
represents the bus voltage phase angles due at a base load
(e.g., obtained by solving the optimal power flow considering
a base load). The temporal independence assumption of the
system state fluctuations can be met by taking measurements
with sufficient load/angle variations over time.
State Estimation and Bad Data Detection: The system state
θ[t] is monitored using sensors deployed at the buses and
transmission lines. These sensors measure respectively the
nodal power injections and the forward/reverse line power
flows. Under the linear power flow model, these measure-
ments, which we denote by z[t] ∈ RM (where M denotes
the number of measurements), are related to the system state
θ[t] ∈ RN as
z[t] = Hθ[t] + n[t], t = 1, 2, · · · , T, (1)
where H ∈ RM×N is the measurement matrix and n[t] is the
sensor measurement noise. The noise is assumed to be zero-
mean Gaussian1 with covariance matrix σ2nI, and independent
of the system state θ[t]. It is also assumed to be i.i.d. across
the time slots. Without the loss of generality we set σ2n =
1 throughout the paper, and scale the covariance of the θ[t]
appropriately (i.e., we set (σ′θ)
2 = (σ2θ/σ
2
n) in our analysis).
The measurement matrix H depends on the system topology
(i.e., the bus connectivity) and the branch reactances [19]. We
assume that within the considered time interval T , H does not
change. The estimate of the system state, denoted by θ̂[t], is
recovered from the measurement vector z[t] using a maximum-
likelihood (ML) technique [18]: θ̂[t] =
(
HTH
)−1
HT z[t].
After state estimation, the residual vector is given by
r[t] = z[t]−Hθ̂[t]. The BDD checks for possible measurement
inconsistencies in z[t] works by comparing the norm of the
residual vector r = ||r[t]||2 against a pre-defined threshold ζ.
It raises an alarm if r ≥ ζ. The threshold ζ is selected to
ensure a certain false-positive (FP) rate.
Attacker Model: We consider an attacker who can eavesdrop
on the measurement data communicated between the field de-
vices and the control center by exploiting vulnerabilities in the
communication system. We consider different read and write
capabilities for the attacker, since read access only requires
passive sniffing of the network data whereas write access
requires modifying the network packets (which is typically
harder to perform in practice). Accordingly, we assume that the
attacker can read all the measurements in the system (i.e., no
missing measurements). However, the attacker may have write
access to only a partial subset of measurements (see Section
V). Furthermore, the attacker has no other information about
the grid (e.g., its topology or transmission line reactances).
1We note that the analysis in this paper is more generally applicable to
any distribution of the noise as long as the distribution has a bounded fourth
moment.
The attacker’s objective is to craft FDI attacks against the
state estimation. Denote the attack vector by a[t] ∈ RM , the
sensor measurements under attack by za[t], where za[t] =
z[t] + a[t], and the BDD residual under attack by ra[t] =
||za[t]−Hθ̂a[t]||2. It has been shown [3] that for an attack of
the form a[t] = Hc[t], the residual value remains unchanged
under the attack, i.e., ra[t] = r[t]. Hence, the BDD’s detection
probability for such attacks is no greater than the FP rate. We
will henceforth refer to these attacks as undetectable attacks.
Note that constructing an undetectable FDI attack requires the
knowledge of H. In data-driven FDI attack, the attacker strives
to construct an undetectable FDI attack by learning the system
parameters using the accessed measurement data.
III. SUBSPACE METHOD BASED ALGORITHM AND THE
DRAWBACKS
In this section, we review existing subspace-based ap-
proaches for constructing undetectable data-driven FDI at-
tacks [5], [6], [7], and point out its drawbacks under a practical
regime of a limited observation time window.
A. Algorithm Description
Note that designing an undetectable attack is equivalent
to finding a non-zero vector in Col(H), or equivalently, a
linear combination of the basis vectors that span Col(H).
The attacker must estimate the basis vectors using the noisy
measurement data z[t], t = 1, . . . , T. This problem is well
studied in the signal processing literature [25], and has been
used to guide the construction of data-driven FDI attacks.
The key idea is to use the covariance matrix of the mea-
surements Σz = E[(z[t]−E[z[t]])(z[t]−E[z[t]])T ]. From (1),
it follows that
Σz = σ
2
θHH
T + I. (2)
Let UΛUT be the SVD of Σz, where U = [u1, . . . ,uM ],
is a matrix consisting of the eigenvectors of Σz, and Λ =
diag(λ1, . . . , λM ) is a matrix consisting of the eigenvalues of
Σz. Note that the rank of the matrix σ2θHH
T is N. Thus, the
first N columns of U corresponding to the N largest singular
values must form the basis vectors of Col(σ2θHH
T ). Since,
Col(σ2θHH
T ) is equivalent to Col(H), they also form the
basis vectors of Col(H) [25]. Thus, the attacker must estimate
the eigenvectors of Σz in order to construct an undetectable
FDI attack vector.
We note that the attacker cannot directly execute the proce-
dure stated above since the Σz is unknown. However, it can
be estimated using the measurement data {z[t]}Tt=1. Based on
this observation, the procedure to construct data-driven FDI
attacks is summarized in Alg.1. (We use the superscript̂ to
denote estimates of the corresponding quantities. The notation
As denotes a matrix consisting of the first s columns of the
matrix A, i.e., As = [a1, . . . ,as], for any integer value s. ).
B. Drawbacks of Existing Techniques
The aforementioned subspace estimation algorithm per-
forms well in a classical setting when the number of temporal
4ALGORITHM 1: Data-driven FDI attack
1. Using measurements {z[1], . . . , z[T ]}, compute the
sample covariance matrix Σ̂z as
Σ̂z =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(z[t]− z¯) (z[t]− z¯)T ,
where z¯ denotes the sample mean given by
z¯ = 1T−1
∑T
t=1 z[t].
2. Perform singular value decomposition (SVD) of Σ̂z as
Σ̂z = ÛΛ̂Û
T , where Û = [û1, . . . , ûM ] and
Λ̂ = diag(λ̂1, . . . , λ̂M ).
3. Construct an undetectable FDI attack vector as
a[t] = ÛNc[t], where c[t] ∈ RN .
measurements are far greater than the system dimension (i.e.,
T M,M/T → 0). However, under a practical setting, it is
unreasonable to expect the availability of an “infinite time win-
dow”, especially for large bus systems. For instance, consider
the IEEE-118 bus system which has M = 490 measurements
per time slot (assuming a fully measured system). Under an
optimistic assumption of obtaining a temporally decorrelated
measurement every minute, the attacker would require a mea-
surement time window of 4900 minutes, or approximately,
80 hours, for the ratio of M/T = 0.1. However, the system
topology may have changed well before this duration.
Thus, we focus on a practically relevant scenario where for
a given bus system, the size of the measurement vector M
and the measurement time window T are of the same orders
of magnitude, i.e., M/T = p. This scenario is especially
relevant for large power grids. Under this regime, the prin-
cipal components estimated by Algorithm 1 are known to be
inconsistent [16]. Thus, in the rest of the paper, we present an
enhanced algorithm for strengthening the attack’s BDD-bypass
probability when the attacker has access to measurements from
a limited time window. Furthermore, we characterize an im-
portant trade-off between the attack’s BDD-bypass probability
and the number of compromised measurements in executing
the attack.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN FDI ATTACKS WITH LIMITED NUMBER
OF MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we present an enhanced algorithm for
designing data-driven FDI attacks. From the discussion in
Section III, note that the problem at hand is equivalent to
estimating the principal eigenvalues/vectors of Σz from the
corresponding sample covariance matrix Σ̂z. Under a limited
measurement period setting, a key issue is that only a few
eigenmodes can be reliably estimated from the sample co-
variance matrix. RMT results can help us identify those key
eigenmodes as well as characterize their estimation accuracy.
We first present a brief overview of RMT and then show its
application to data-driven FDI attacks.
A. Brief Introduction to Random Matrix Theory and the Spiked
Model
RMT studies the properties of matrices whose entries are
random. Of particular interest are the matrix’s spectral prop-
erties when its dimensions grow large.
Marcenko-Pastur Law: Consider a matrix
X = [x[1],x[2], . . . ,x[T ]] ∈ RM×T whose columns
x[1],x[2], . . . are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and identity covriance matrix,
i.e., x[1] ∼ N (0, I), i = 1, . . . , T. When the number of
snapshots T is very large and the vector size M is fixed,
i.e., T → ∞ and M/T → 0, then the sample covariance
matrix converges to the true covariance matrix (I in this case)
asymptotically [26]:
Σ̂x =
1
T
T∑
t=1
x[t]x[t]H
a.s.−→ I 4= E[x[t]x[t]H ]. (3)
The convergence result above holds for any matrix norm, i.e.,
||I − Σ̂x|| → 0 on a set of probability one. Further, the
eigenvalues of Σ̂x will converge to a single mass at 1.
However, when the number of snapshots T is large, but not
extremely large compared to the vector size M, i.e., T →∞
and M/T = p > 0, the above result no longer holds. Specif-
ically, ||I − Σ̂x|| does not go to zero despite element-wise
convergence of Σ̂x to the identity matrix. This can be observed
in Fig. 1 (top figure), where the histogram of eigenvalues
of Σ̂x is plotted for M = 500, T = 2000. Note that the
eigenvalues of Σ̂x do not converge to a single mass at 1, but
are spread around 1. This paradoxical behavior occurs since
despite being large, T is never very large compared to M. The
distribution of the eigenvalues of Σ̂x in this case converges
to a non-random distribution known as the Marcenko-Pastur
(MP) law [27], which has a probability density function given
by
f(x) = (1− p−1)δ(x) + 1
2picx
√
(x− a)+(b− x)+, (4)
where a = (1−√p)2, b = (1 +√p)2 and δ(x) is the Dirac-
delta function. We note that a and b mark the extremities of
the spread of the eigenvalues around 1. Moreover, for T →
∞,M/T = p > 0, it is guaranteed that no eigenvalue of Σ̂x
is found outside the set [a, b], almost surely.
Spiked Model: Next, we describe the spiked model in
RMT. Consider a matrix Y = [y[1],y[2], . . . ,y[T ]] ∈ RM×T
whose columns y[1],y[2], . . . are drawn from the multivariate
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix
given by
Σy = I +
N∑
i=1
µiuiu
H
i . (5)
where N is a fixed quantity. Compared to xi, the covariance
matrix of yi is perturbed by
∑N
i=1 µiuiu
H
i . Under the spiked
model, µ1, . . . , µN are referred to as “spike” eigenvalues. Of
particular interest is a scenario when M,T → ∞,M/T = p
5Fig. 1: Top: Marcenko-Pastur law, Bottom: RMT spiked
model. Figure due to [24].
and the number of spikes N is small in comparison to M and
T. The eigenvalues of Σy are given by
[µ1 + 1, . . . , µN + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N terms
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−N terms
]. (6)
Since N is small compared to M, we note that bulk of the
eigenvalues of Σy are 1 and a few eigenvalues exceed 1.
Now, consider the eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix
Σ̂y =
1
T
∑T
t=1 y[t]y[t]
H . Since the bulk of the eigenvalues of
Σy are 1, the majority of eigenvalues of Σ̂y will lie within
the MP distribution (i.e., between the extremities specified
by a and b). However, one would expect the “leading N
eigenvalues” of Σ̂y (corresponding to the eigenvalues µi + 1
of Σy) to be found outside the distribution of the MP law
(see Fig. 1). Surprisingly, the number of eigenvalues that can
be found outside f depends critically on the ratio p = M/T.
This result was formalized in [20] and stated here:
Theorem 1. Consider y[t] = N (0,Σy) ∈ RM×1, where
Σy is defined in (5). Let ÛΛ̂ÛT denote the eigenvalue
decomposition of Σ̂y, where Û = [û1, . . . , ûM ], and Λ̂ =
diag(λ̂1, . . . , λ̂M ). Assume N is fixed, and independent of M
and T. Then, when M,T → ∞,M/T = p, for all µi > √p,
with probability one, λ̂i ≥ (1 +√pN )2 and∣∣∣λ̂i − 1− µi − p(1 + µi)
µi
∣∣∣ a.s.−→ 0. (7)
Moreover, |µi − µ̂i| a.s.−→ 0, where µ̂i can be obtained from λ̂i
as
µ̂i =
λ̂i + 1− p+
√
(λ̂i + 1− p)2 − 4λ̂i
2
− 1. (8)
Further, for all µi >
√
p, we also have∣∣∣ûTi ujuTj ûi − 1− p/µ2i1 + p/µi δi=j
∣∣∣ a.s.−→ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , s. (9)
The main idea of Theorem 1 is the following. Consider
µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µs > √p, 1 ≤ s ≤ N, (10)
where s ≤ N is the number of spike eigenvalues that are
greater than
√
p. Then, the result [20] states that for all
µi >
√
p, when M,T → ∞,M/T = p > 0, there exists a
deterministic and one-to-one mapping between eigenvalue of
the sample covariance matrix (Σ̂y), i.e., between λ̂i and µi.
In other words, all µi which satisfy µi >
√
p can be recovered
from the eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix. A
similar result also holds for estimating the corresponding
eigenvectors [21], i.e., the corresponding eigenvectors (for
which µi >
√
p) can be reliably recovered from the eigen-
vectors of the sample covariance matrix (see Theorem 1). It
is important to note that for eigenmodes corresponding to
µi <
√
p, these relationships do not hold, and the corre-
sponding eigenvalue/vectors cannot be recovered. Thus, the
quantity
√
p represents a fundamental “phase transition” point
in estimating the spike eigenvalues/vectors from the sample
covariance matrix.
B. Application of Spiked Model To Data-Driven FDI Attack
We now discuss the application of RMT spiked model
results to our problem. From (1), the covariance matrix of
the measurements Σz can be expressed through eigen decom-
position as
Σz = I +
N∑
i=1
µiuiu
H
i . (11)
where {µi}Ni=1 denote the eigenvalues of σ2θHHH and
{ui}Ni=1 the corresponding eigenvectors. The result of RMT
spiked model is important in the context of data-driven FDI
attack, since it precisely characterizes the information about
Col(H) that the attacker can recover from the measurements
as a function of the observation time window T (specifically,
the ratio p = M/T ). To construct a data-driven FDI that can
bypass the BDD with a high probability, the attacker must
first estimate the number of eigenvalues/vectors, s, that can
be reliably recovered from the measurements {z[t]}Tt=1. Note
that the attacker cannot directly use (10) to determine s, since
the value of µi is not known. Using the result of Theorem
1, it follows that for µi >
√
p, with probability 1, we have
λ̂i > (1+
√
p)2. Thus the attacker can determine s by counting
the number of eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix that
exceed (1 +
√
p)2 , i.e.,
s = {#i, λ̂i > (1 +√p)2}. (12)
Note that the direct application of the subspace estimation
algorithm as proposed in [5], [6], [7] (Algorithm 1) uses all N
estimated eigenmodes for the construction of the FDI attack.
However, following the application of RMT spiked model
results, it is clear that eigenmodes for which µi <
√
p cannot
6be recovered from the sample covariance matrix, and hence,
must not be used in the construction of FDI attack.
After determining s, the attacker can construct a data-
driven FDI attack as a = Ûscs, where cs ∈ Rs denotes an
s−dimensional vector. In particular, the vector cs can be tuned
by the attacker to achieve his objectives, such as minimizing
the attack’s detection probability or causing the desired attack
impact. In the rest of this section, we describe how the attacker
can achieve these objectives using results from RMT.
We first focus on attack detection probability. To this end,
we characterize the BDD residual with a data-driven FDI
attack.
Lemma 1. For a data-driven FDI attack a = Ûscs, the BDD
residual with attack, ra, follows a non-central χ2 distribution
with M−N degrees of freedom and a non-centrality parameter
ν given by
ν = cTs cs − cTs ÛTs UNUTNÛscs. (13)
For M,T →∞,M/T = p the second term of the right hand
side of (13) converges to
cTs Û
T
s UNU
T
NÛscs − cTs Ωscs a.s.−→ 0, (14)
where Ωs = diag(ω1, . . . , ωs) and
ωi =
1− p/µ2i
1 + p/µi
, i = 1, . . . , s. (15)
Further, the attacker can obtain a consistent estimator ω̂i of
ωi as |ωi − ω̂i| a.s.−→ 0, i = 1, . . . , s where,
ω̂i =
1− p/µ̂2i
1 + p/µ̂i
, i = 1, . . . , s, (16)
and µ̂i as in (8). Thus, it follows that
ν − cTs (I− Ω̂s)cs a.s.−→ 0, (17)
where Ω̂s = diag(ω̂1, . . . , ω̂s).
Proof. The proof is omitted due to the lack of space and can
be found in Appendix A, Part I.
The result of (13) along with the asymptotic approximations
(14)-(16) provides a tractable expression for the attacker to
compute the detection probability for a given data-driven FDI
attack a = Ûscs. Observe that all the quantities required to
compute the asymptotic approximation of ν depend on the
estimated parameters only (i.e., λ̂i). Using these expressions,
the attacker can tune cs to minimize the attack’s detection
probability. We analyze the results further.
Note that the entries of the matrix ÛTs UNU
T
NÛs represent
the projection of the eigenvectors of the sample covariance
matrix Σ̂z onto the eigenvectors of the population covariance
matrix Σz. In particular, the result of Lemma 1 states that
asymptotically, the estimated eigenvectors ûi are orthogonal to
uj , j 6= i, since Ωs is diagonal. Specifically, |ûTi ui|2 a.s.−→ ωi
and |ûTi uj |2 a.s.−→ 0, i 6= j. The following lemma illustrates the
relationship between the projections.
Lemma 2. The diagonal elements {ωi}si=1 and {ω̂i}si=1 follow
1 > ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥, . . . ,≥ ωs > 0 and 1 > ω̂1 ≥ ω̂2 ≥, . . . ,≥
ω̂s > 0 respectively.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix B.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it follows that the projection
of ûi onto ui is in the decreasing order of the eigenmode
index. Note that minimizing the detection probability is equiv-
alent to minimizing the non-centrality parameter ν of the χ2
distribution. From (17), it follows the attacker can compute cs
which minimizes cTs (I−Ω̂s)cs. However, directly minimizing
this expression would result in a trivial solution cs = 0, (i.e.,
a zero attack). Thus, we must constrain the attack impact in
order to obtain a meaningful attack.
We quantify the attack impact in terms of the second norm
of the error in state estimate (for the system operator) due
to the FDI attack. Specifically, we let θ̂
a
denote the estimate
of the system state from measurements with FDI attack, za.
Then, ∆θ 4= θ̂ − θ̂a is the error in the state estimate due to
the FDI attack. Using this, the data-driven FDI attack can be
formulated as the following optimization problem:
min
cs
cTs (I− Ω̂s)cs (18)
s.t. ||∆θ||22 ≥ τ
In the optimization problem (18), the attacker designs cs
to minimize the probability of detection among all attacks
that satisfy ||∆θ||22 ≥ τ. However, (18) cannot be solved by
the attacker directly, as ||∆θ||22 depends on the measurement
matrix H, that is unknown to the attacker. To address this
issue, we present a consistent estimate of ||∆θ||22 in the large
system regime that depends only on the attacker’s estimated
parameters in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For M,T →∞, the quantity ||∆θ||22 converges to
||∆θ||22 − σ2θcTs M−1Ωcs a.s.−→ 0. (19)
Further, we have
σ2θc
T
s M
−1Ωcs − σ̂2θcTs M̂−1Ω̂cs a.s.−→ 0, (20)
where M = diag(µ1, . . . , µN ) and M̂ = diag(µ̂1, . . . , µ̂N ).
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A, Part II.
Note from Lemma 3 that the asymptotic approximation
of ||∆θ||22 depends on the estimate of the variance of the
system state σ̂2θ . The attacker can estimate this by monitoring
historical fluctuations of the system load (note that this is a
second-order statistic and hence, need not be estimated in real-
time).
Based on the result of Lemma 3, optimization problem (18)
can be reformulated as follows:
min
cs
cTs (I− Ω̂s)cs (21)
s.t. σ̂2θc
T
s M̂
−1Ω̂scs ≥ τ
The solution to (21) can be characterized in closed form and
its result leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For M,T → ∞,M/T = p, the optimal data-
driven FDI attack that solves (21) is given by
a =
√
τ
σ̂2θ(ω̂1/µ̂1)
û1. (22)
7Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 follows by noting that the
solution to optimization problem (21) is given by c1 =√
τ
σ̂2θ(ω̂1/µ̂1)
and c2 = c3 = · · · = cs = 0. The details are
presented in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 implies that the attacker can minimize the
detection probability by aligning the attack vector along û1
while achieving the desired attack impact. Coincidentally, from
Lemma 2, û1 is also the most accurately estimated eigenmode.
Theorem 2 also implies that the optimal attack must be
restricted to a 1−dimensional subspace of the estimated space
ÛN . A natural question is whether there a cost to pay for this
restriction? We will address this question in the next section
where we consider the attack’s sparsity in addition to the
factors considered in this section.
C. Discussion
A few comments are in order regarding our results. First,
we note from Theorem 1 that the application of spiked model
requires N to be fixed and independent of M and T. Strictly
speaking, the power grid model does not satisfy this condition,
since N (dimension of the state vector) also grows for large
grids. However, despite this limitation, we will show by
simulations in Section VI that RMT spiked model results are
accurate for various power grid bus configurations as long
as the number of sensor measurements M is large compared
to N. In other words, our results match closely when there
are a significant number of redundant measurements, which is
reasonable for the state estimation problem [18], [19]. Thus,
the RMT spiked model can be used for analysing the data-
driven FDI attacks.
Second, our results assume that the sensor measurement
noises have identical variances, i.e., Σn = E[n[t]n[t]T ] =
σ2I. When they are not identical, i.e., when Σn =
diag[σ21 , σ
2
2 , . . . , σ
2
M ], then the attacker must modify the results
(of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3) using those from a generalized
spiked model as in [28].
V. TRADE-OFFS IN DATA-DRIVEN FDI ATTACKS
The analysis considered thus far in this paper only focusses
on attacker’s learning of Col(H). The learning phase only
requires the attacker to obtain read access to the sensor
measurements. However, executing the FDI attack requires the
attacker to modify the sensor measurements values, which in
turn requires write access. A graphical illustration is presented
in Fig. 2. Note that from an attacker’s point of view, read
access to sensor measurements is easier to obtain compared
to write access, since it only involves passive sniffing of the
network data, where as write access requires modification of
the network packets. Thus, resource-constrained attackers may
wish to minimize the number of sensors they must compromise
to execute the FDI attack, or equivalently, maximize the
attack’s sparsity.
Recall that from our analysis in the previous section, the
optimal data-driven FDI attack is one that is restricted to a
1− dimensional subspace of the estimated space. Restricting
the attack to a lower-dimensional subspace makes it hard to
Fig. 2: Learning and execution phase of data-driven FDI
attack.
enforce sparsity. Naturally, maximum sparsity of the attack
vector can be achieved if we have an unconstrained choice of
the attack vector over the full estimated column space. On the
other hand, using the inaccurately estimated basis vectors will
increase the attack’s detection probability (recall that the first
basis is estimated most accurately, followed by the second, etc.
refer to Lemma 2). Thus, the attacker faces a fundamental
trade-off between the attack’s BDD-bypass probability and
the attack’s sparsity. In particular, the number of estimated
eigenmodes for constructing the FDI attack must be chosen to
balance between the two factors.
To formalize this trade-off, we cast the FDI attack construc-
tion as a sparse optimization problem for all m = 1, . . . , s as
follows:
K∗m = min
cm
‖Ûmcm‖0, (23)
s.t. cTmM̂
−1Ω̂cm ≥ τ.
The objective function of (23) gives the number of non-zero
elements in the FDI attack vector while restricting the attack
vector to an m−dimensional subspace of the estimated column
space, where m ≤ s ((12)). The optimization problem (23) can
be solved using an l1−relaxation based approach. We omit
the details here and refer the reader to [23]. We illustrate the
trade-off by simulations in Section VI.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results. All the
simulations are conducted using the MATPOWER simulator
[29]. Unless stated otherwise, the simulations are conducted
using an IEEE-14 bus system considering the DC power flow
model of (1). As in standard DC state estimation, we consider
the forward and reverse power flows and nodal power injection
measurements. For the IEEE-14 bus system, the number of
measurements M = 2× L+N = 54 (recall L is the number
of links and N is the number of nodes). We consider Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σn = 0.02 pu (approximately
1 − 2% of the full-scale measurement). The eigenmodes are
estimated following the steps 1 and 2 of Algorithm 1. The
measurement data is generated according to (1), where θ[t] =
θ¯ + [t]. Here in, θ¯ is obtained by solving the optimal power
flow formulation considering base load values provided in the
MATPOWER case file. The fluctuations [t] are assumed to be
i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors with standard deviation σθ =
0.002 pu (i.e., σθ/σn = 0.1). The FDI attacks are constructed
using the estimated eigenmodes and their detection probability
is computed by averaging the BDD’s detection results over
1000 independent trials. The BDD threshold is adjusted such
that the FP rate is set to 0.02. The results are presented next.
8A. Eigenmode Estimation Accuracy
First, we examine the estimation accuracy of different eigen-
modes by evaluating the projection metric |ûTi ui|2. We also
verify the accuracy of the RMT approximation in Theorem 1.
To this end, we compare |ûTi ui|2 obtained from simulations
with ω̂i computed according to (16). For the measurement time
window T, we consider two regimes, (i) a non-asymptotic
regime with T = 0.5M and (ii) an asymptotic regime with
T = 100M. The results are plotted in Fig. 3 by averaging
across 1000 trials. The bars represent mean values over the
trials and the vertical lines (on top of the bars) represent the
fluctuation around this mean value. We make the following
observations.
Firstly, in the non-asymptotic regime, the estimation accu-
racies of the different eigenmodes vary. In particular, they are
arranged in the decreasing order of the eigenmode index. This
is consistent with our observation in Lemma 2. Secondly, it can
be observed that the RMT approximations ω̂i (blue bars) are
reasonably accurate, though there is a non-zero but negligible
gap between the simulations and RMT results. The gap exists
due to the fact that the number of spikes in the power grid
model are large and equal to the dimension of the state vector
(see the discussion in Section IV-A). However, despite this
limitation, the gap is small and the RMT results are a good
approximation. Thirdly, recall that RMT approximations only
exist for the eigenmodes i ≤ s where s is computed according
to (14). The value of s for each of the simulation cases is
indicated in the figure description. It can be observed that
the estimation accuracy for eigenmodes beyond this value of
s is poor. Hence, they must not be utilized for FDI attack
construction as prescribed by our analysis based on the RMT
spiked model. Finally, we observe that in the asymptotic
regime however, i.e. T = 100M , all the eigenmodes can be
estimated with a high accuracy and Algorithm 1 can be used
directly for the design of FDI attack.
B. Detection Probability of Data-Driven FDI Attacks
Next, we examine the detection probability of FDI attacks
constructed using different estimated eigenmodes. Specifically,
for each estimated eigenmode i, the FDI attack is constructed
as a = ciûi, where ci is set to ci =
√
τ
ω̂i/µ̂i
, such that
it satisfies the constraint of (21). Recall that asymptotically
this ensures that ||∆θ||22 ≥ τ . The value of τ is set to
0.3. This causes an average normalized state estimation error
(across trials), measured as η = ||θ̂a−θ||2
||θ̂−θ||2
, of 4. Note that η
represents the increase in state estimation due to the attack
(herein, a 4 times increase in the state estimation error). We
conduct 1000 simulation trials and plot the results in Fig. 4.
The RMT approximations of the detection probability are
also plotted in Fig. 4. They are computed by evaluating the
P(X ≥ τ), where X is a χ2 distributed random variable with
M − N degrees of freedom and a non-centrality parameter
ν = cTs Ω̂scs (following the result of Lemma 1). Once again,
we make the following observations. Firstly, the detection
probability increases with the eigenmode index and the attack
a = c1û1 has the lowest detection probability, confirming the
Fig. 3: Eigenmode estimation accuracy using simulations and
RMT approximation. Top: non-asymptotic regime, p = 0.5
(s = 7), Bottom: asymptotic regime, p = 0.005 (s = 12).
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Fig. 4: Detection probability of FDI attacks constructed using
different eigenmodes. s = 7 for p = 0.5, s = 11 for p = 0.05,
and s = 12 for p = 0.005 respectively.
result of Theorem 2. Secondly, it can be observed for i ≥ s,
the detection probability becomes very high, thus confirming
the phase transition phenomenon of the RMT spiked model.
Finally, the detection probability becomes lower as we increase
the training time T .
We also compare our results to data-driven FDI attacks
proposed in prior work [5], [6] in Figure 5. Here in, attack 1 is
constructed according to Theorem 2. Attack 2 is constructed
using the entire estimated subspace, i.e., a2 = ÛNcN , where
the elements of cN are set to ci =
√
τ
Nω̂i/µ̂i
, i = 1, . . . , N.
Note that cN is adjusted to satisfy ||∆θ||22 ≥ τ. As expected,
the detection probability of attack 1 is significantly lower
compared to attack 2.
We also examine the algorithm’s performance for different
values of σθ. We vary σθ/σn and examine the attack detection
probability. In Fig. 6, we observe that as σθ/σn increases,
the detection probability decreases. This is because a higher
9Fig. 5: Attack detection probability as a function of the
measurement time window. Attack 1 : optimal data-driven FDI
attack (Theorem 2), Attack 2: FDI attack constructed using the
entire estimated subspace.
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Fig. 6: Attack detection probability for M/T = 0.5 and
different values of σθ/σn.
variation in the system state enables the attacker to estimate
Col(H) more accurately. This is also confirmed by our theo-
retical result – note that µi increases with an increase in σθ,
which in turn results in a more accurate estimate of the basis
vectors of Col(H) (note from Appendix C, equation (30), that
ωi increases with µi). Thus, the attacker can bypass the BDD
with a higher probability.
C. Attack Detection Probability Under AC State Estimation
We also test the robustness of the attacks in bypassing the
BDD under a non-linear AC power flow model. We inject the
attack vector designed according to Theorem 2 (i.e., attacks
generated based on the linear model) into measurements
derived from an AC power flow model and compute the
attack detection probability. We adjust the value of τ to cause
different attack impact (measured in terms of η = ||θ̂a−θ||2
||θ̂−θ||2
).
For reference, we also plot the detection probability under the
state estimation of the DC power flow model with η = 4.
The results are plotted in Fig. 7. We observe that attacks
designed based on the linear model can bypass the BDD of AC
state estimation with a high probability and cause a significant
attack impact. For instance, when M/T = 0.5, the attack
can achieve η = 2 while its detection probability remains
0.2. We also observe that as the measurement time window T
increases, the attack is capable of causing a larger impact while
bypassing the BDD with a high probability. This observation
is consistent with the findings in [5], [30], where it was also
0.5 0.1 0.01 0.001
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Fig. 7: Detection probability of data-driven attack (designed
as in Theorem 2) under BDD of AC and DC state estimation
for different values of M/T and η (attack impact).
Fig. 8: Trade-off between attack sparsity and the attack detec-
tion probability.
observed that attacks constructed based on the linear model
remain valid under the AC model.
D. Trade-offs in Data-Driven FDI Attacks
Next, we illustrate the trade-off between attack’s sparsity
and the detection probability in Fig. 8. The points on the
trade-off curve are obtained by varying m in (23). Specifically,
we compute an attack vector for each value of m, and
then compute the corresponding detection probability and the
attack’s sparsity. Note that sparsity of the attack vector is equal
to M −K∗m. We repeat the simulations for different training
times T (i.e. varying p). It can be observed that in the non-
asymptotic regime (i.e, small T ), the attack’s sparsity can be
enhanced if the attacker can tolerate an increase in the attack
detection probability (refer to the red and blue curves). For
large T however, the attacker can simply utilize the entire
estimated subspace without having to compromise the attack’s
detection probability (green and black curves). In practice,
the attacker can make use of such trade-off curves to select
suitable parameters for the construction of the FDI attack, e.g.,
based on the available resources.
E. Simulations with Large Bus Systems
To show our effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in large
bus systems, we conduct simulations using IEEE-39 and 118-
bus systems. Except for the bus configuration settings, rest
of the settings are maintained identical to that of Fig. 5. We
plot the detection probability as a function of the observation
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Fig. 9: Attack detection probability as a function of the
measurement time window for IEEE-39 and 118 bus systems.
Attack 1 : optimal data-driven FDI attack (Theorem 2), Attack
2: FDI attack constructed using the entire estimated subspace.
time window, and compare it to an approach that uses the
entire estimated subspace to construct the FDI attack. In Fig. 9,
it can be observed that under the limited observation time
window, the proposed approach significantly reduces the attack
detection probability, thus confirming the effectiveness of our
approach in these systems as well.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied the construction of data-driven FDI attacks
when the attacker has access to measurements from a limited
observation time window. We showed that in this regime,
the attacker can enhance the BDD-bypass probability by
constraining the attack vector to a lower-dimensional subspace
spanned by the accurately estimated basis vectors. We used
results from RMT spiked model to analyze the algorithm
performance. We also characterized an important trade-off
between the attacker’s ability to bypass the BDD and the spar-
sity the attack vector. Our framework gives practical guidance
to a resource-constrained attacker in designing stealthy FDI
attacks. In the future, we will explore how the results of this
work can be used to address the defense problem against these
attackers (e.g., MTD).
There are several interesting future research directions. First,
our framework assumes that the attacker has read access to
all the measurements within the considered time window.
However, in practice, there may be missing measurements due
to communication loss or device malfunctions (see references
[10], [11]). Studying data-driven FDI attacks with missing
measurements under a limited measurement time window
setting would require combining RMT results with that of
robust PCA techniques, which is an interesting future research
direction. Second, the design of data-driven FDI attacks under
a limited measurement period setting for a non-linear AC
power flow is challenging. While our results evidence that
attacks constructed using the linear model can bypass the
BDD of AC state estimation, the performance can be further
enhanced considering a non-linear model in attack design.
Finally, the design of defense strategies against data-driven
FDI attacks (such as MTD) based on the understanding of the
attacker’s capabilities will be a critical problem for power grid
operators.
APPENDIX A: UNDETECTABLE ATTACKS
Part I: Proof of Lemma 1
First recall that the residual vector is given by
r = z−Hθ̂ = (I−K)z, (24)
where in (24), we have substituted θ̂ = (HTH)−1HT z (note
W = IM ) and denoted K = H(HTH)−1HT . Further
substituting z = Hθ + n, we obtain,
r = (I−K)(Hθ + n) = (I−K)n, (25)
where (25) follows since (I−K)H = 0.
Now consider the residual for measurements with FDI attack
za = z + a. The residual denoted by ra is given by:
ra = (I−K)za
(a)
= (I−K)(n + a)
(b)
= (I−UNUTN )(n + a), (26)
where in (a), we have once again use (I − K)H = 0, and
in (b), we have used the fact that K can be decomposed as
K = UNU
T
N . Since the noise is Gaussian, ‖ra‖22 follows a
non central chi-square distribution with M − N degrees of
freedom and noncentrality parameter ν given by
E
[‖ra‖22] = ν = aTa− aTUNUTNÛsas. (27)
In particular, for a data-driven FDI attack of the form a =
Ûscs, we have
ν = cTs cs − cTs ÛTs UNUTNÛscs. (28)
For M,T →∞,M/T = c, using the result of Theorem 1, the
matrix ÛTs UNU
T
NÛs converges to a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are given by ωi defined in (15). Since N is
assumed to be fixed (and finite) and independent of M and T
(see Theorem 1), we obtain,
cTs Û
T
s UNU
T
NÛscs − cTs Ωscs a.s.−→ 0.
Further, using the result |µi − µ̂i| a.s.−→ 0, i = 1, . . . , s (The-
orem 1), from continuous mapping theorem [26], it follows
that
|ωi − ω̂i| a.s.−→ 0, i = 1, . . . , s.
Note that ωi is a continuous function µi (see (15)).
A. Part II: Proof of Lemma 3
Since θ̂ = (HTH)−1HT z, it follows that ∆θ̂ is given by
∆θ̂ = (HTH)−1HT (za − z)
∆θ̂ = (HTH)−1HT Ûscs. (29)
From (29), we obtain,
||∆θ̂||2 = cTs ÛTs H(HTH)−2HT Ûscs
(a)
= cTs Û
T
s UND
−1UTNÛscs,
(b)
= σ2θc
T
s Û
T
s UNM
−1UTNÛscs.
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where (a) follows since H(HTH)−2HT = UTND
−1UTN .
Here in, D = diag(d1, . . . , dN ), where {di}Ni=1 are the first
N eigenvalues of HHT (in decreasing order). In (b), recall
that M = diag(µ1, . . . , µN ), where µi are the eigenvalues of
σ2θHH
T . Similar to the proof of Lemma 1 (Part I), it can be
shown that
cTs Û
T
s UNM
−1UTs ÛNcs − σ̂2θcTs M̂−1Ω̂cs a.s.−→ 0.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First, we consider the proof of 1 > ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥, . . . ,≥ ωs >
0.
We first show that 0 ≤ ωi ≤ 1,∀i. By definition µi > √p
for i = 1, . . . , s. For µi >
√
p, we have 1− p/µ2i > 0. Thus,
ωi > 0,∀i.
Also, it is straightforward to note that 1 − p/µ2i < 1 and
1 + p/µi > 1. Thus, ωi =
1−p/µ2i
1+p/µi
< 1,∀i.
Finally, note that the derivative of ωi with respect to µi is
given by
dωi
dµi
=
µ2i p+ 2µip+ p
2
µi(µi + p)
> 0. (30)
where in (30), the inequality follows since all terms in the
derivative are positive. Thus, we conclude that ωi is an increas-
ing function of µi. Since by definition, µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥, . . . ,≥ µs,
it follows that 1 > ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥, . . . ,≥ ωs.
Next, we consider the proof of 1 > ω̂1 ≥ ω̂2 ≥, . . . ,≥
ω̂s > 0. Once again, by definition, we have λ̂i > (1 +
√
p)2
for i = 1, . . . , s. It can be verified from Theorem 1 that for
λ̂i > (1 +
√
p)2, µ̂i >
√
p. Thus, 1 > ω̂1 ≥ ω̂2 ≥, . . . ,≥
ω̂s > 0 can be proved by arguments identical to the previous
case (i.e., the proof of 1 > ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥, . . . ,≥ ωs > 0).
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Note that optimization problem (21) can be rewritten as
min
c
s∑
i=1
(1− ω̂i)c2i , s.t.
s∑
i=1
σ̂2θ
(
ω̂i
µ̂i
)
c2i ≥ τ. (31)
By a simple replacement of the variable yi = c2i , (31) becomes
min
y
s∑
i=1
(1− ω̂i)yi, s.t.
s∑
i=1
σ̂2θ
(
ω̂i
µ̂i
)
yi ≥ τ.
Note that (32) is a linear programming (LP) problem. Since the
coefficients of the objective function as well as the constraints
are positive (see Appendix B), the optimal solution of (32)
must satisfy the constraint with equality, i.e.,
∑s
i=1
(
ω̂i
µ̂i
)
yi =
τ . Thus, we can replace the inequality constraint of (32) with
equality. We perform one more change of variable as
yi = κi
(
τ
σ̂2θ(ω̂i/µ̂i)
)
, i = 1, . . . , s.
The LP (32) along with replacing the constraint with equality
now becomes
min
κ
s∑
i=1
(
1− ω̂i
σ̂2θ(ω̂i/µ̂i)
)
κi, s.t.
s∑
i=1
κi = 1.
It can be verified that the coefficients of the objective function
1− ω̂i
σ̂2θ(ω̂i/µ̂i)
is a decreasing function of µ̂i. (This can be verified by differ-
entiating the coefficient terms with respect to µi and noting
that the derivative is negative.) Since µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µs,
we have,
1− ω̂1
σ̂2θ(ω̂1/µ̂1)
≥ 1− ω̂2
σ̂2θ(ω̂2/µ̂2)
≥ · · · ≥ 1− ω̂s
σ̂2θ(ω̂s/µ̂s)
.
The solution to (32) is thus given by κ1 = 1, κ2 = κ3 = · · · =
κs = 0. Hence, the solution to (31) becomes
c1 =
√
τ
σ̂2θ(ω̂i/µ̂i)
and c2 = c3 = · · · = cs = 0.
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